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THE COLLAPSE OF AN EMPIRE?
RATING AGENCY REFORM IN THE WAKE OF
THE 2007 FINANCIAL CRISIS
Elizabeth Devine*
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion.
There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s bond rating service. The
United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can
destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear
sometimes who’s more powerful.”
—Thomas Friedman 1

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Thomas Friedman’s remarks echoed the sentiments of
many. The rating agency business was booming, and it seemed like the
agencies themselves could do no wrong. Because nearly every financial
business was limited in some way by credit ratings, 2 a rating agency
became the most powerful player in many business transactions. If
issuers and investors could keep the rating agencies profitable, and if
rating agencies could provide issuers and investors with the ratings they
needed, what could possibly go wrong?
In 2007, the fall of the U.S. housing market sparked a “once in a

* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Georgetown University, 2005.
The author would like to thank Professors Joan Caridi and Judith MacDonald for their
insightful introduction to this topic. The author would also like to express her gratitude
to the editors and staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their
valuable suggestions and superior editing skills. Special thanks are also due to the
author’s family and friends for their unwavering love and support.
1. Interview by Jim Lehrer with Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times
Columnist, on The News Hour, PBS Television (Feb. 13, 1996).
2. FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 66 (1st ed. 2003).
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century credit tsunami,” 3 resulting in a worldwide financial meltdown.
The financial crisis was triggered by the failure of the market for
collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”), particularly in the segment
based upon subprime mortgages. 4 The crisis began and has been fueled
by the fact that the CDOs with the highest ratings were worth far less
than their face amounts. 5 In effect, their ratings were worthless.
As analysts begin to investigate who is to blame for the current
financial situation, some argue it was the fault of overzealous lenders,
others say that homeowners were simply borrowing well beyond their
means, but many analysts now point fingers at the rating agencies
themselves. By giving mortgage-backed securities the top ratings and
underestimating the risk of default and foreclosure, the rating agencies
played a key role in inflating the housing bubble and contributing to the
financial meltdown. 6 “How on earth could a bond issue be AAA one
day and junk the next unless something spectacularly stupid has taken
place . . . ? [M]aybe it was something spectacularly dishonest like taking
that colossal amount of fees in return for doing what Lehman and the
rest wanted.” 7
The key to the rating agencies’ involvement in the financial crisis is
that the unregulated ratings for asset-backed securities in CDOs became
proxies for the full disclosure required by securities law. 8 The SEC
detailed in a report that the rating agencies failed to accurately rate the
creditworthiness of many structured financial products resulting in the
overreliance by both the government and investors on the inaccurate
ratings. 9 The consequences of this reliance came to the detriment of

3. Kristofor W. Nelson, Note, Rough Waters for the Ratings Companies: Should
the Securities Ratings Companies Be Held Liable for Investor Reliance in the Wake of
the Real Estate Meltdown of 2007-2008?, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177, 1177 (2009).
4. Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities
Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1359, 1361 (2009).
5. Id.
6. James Surowiecki, Ratings Downgrade, NEW YORKER, Sept. 28, 2009, at 25.
7. Kevin G. Hall, How Moody’s Sold Its Ratings—and Sold Out Investors,
MCCLATCHY-TRIB. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 16, 2009 (citing Lawrence McDonald, former
vice president of Lehman Brothers).
8. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1361-62.
9. Approaches to Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) [hereinafter Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee Hearing]
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investors, and later, the markets themselves.
Though analysts, scholars and lawmakers struggle to find the exact
cause of the financial meltdown, one thing is clear. If we are going to
reform the system, and prevent a similar crisis in the future, fixing the
rating agencies should be at the top of the list. 10 Congress must
reevaluate how the rating agencies conduct their business. With respect
to how to reform the rating agencies, two questions come to mind. First,
are the rating agencies simultaneously too protected and too unregulated
by the government? Second, were the judgments of the rating agencies
tainted?
This paper argues that current securities regulation is not equipped
to respond to another financial meltdown of this magnitude. It suggests
the best response to prevent another crisis is not to halt or alter the
issuance of certain financial structures, but to reform the rating agencies
that rate these structures, making the rating process more transparent and
legitimate.
Part I of this paper describes the evolution of the rating agency
business and the growth and importance of nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations. Part II discusses the growth of
mortgage-backed securities and the increasingly important role rating
agencies played in the securitization market. Part III focuses on the
collapse of the rating agency empire, analyzing the holes in the system
that may have contributed to the 2007 financial meltdown. Part IV
questions the reality of reforming the rating agency business and
discusses why past attempts at reform failed. Finally, Part V argues that
reform is necessary in order to recover from the current financial crisis
and prevent a future one. It focuses on the importance of transparency,
and discusses proposed litigation regarding reform.
I. HISTORY
Rating agencies have been around for about a century, 11 beginning
in 1909 when John Moody set about synthesizing all types of credit
information into a single rating, publishing a manual called “Moody’s
Analyses of Railroad Investments.” 12 By the mid-1920s, the idea of a
unified credit rating had caught on, and three competitors joined
(statement of Spencer Bachus, Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services).
10. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
11. Id.
12. Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at 36.

180

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

Moody’s: Standard Statistics, Poor’s Publishing and Fitch. 13 Rating
agencies rate debt obligations based on the ability of an issuer to make
timely payments on securities. 14 Ratings are meant to be an estimate of
probabilities, 15 and are not a recommendation to buy or sell. Now, as it
was nearly one hundred years ago, “a triple-A rating has been regarded
as the gold standard for safety and security of these investments.” 16
Though the ratings provided by the rating agencies were useful to
investors, it was not until the 1930s, when regulators began
incorporating ratings into their regulatory schemes, that the rating
agencies gained popularity. For example, the Banking Act of 1935
provided that national banks could only purchase securities that were
investment securities. 17 In 1936, the U.S. Treasury Department further
classified this restriction on banks, defining “investment securities” to be
securities that were not “distinctly and predominately speculative”
according to a “designated standard” which must be “supported by not
less than two rating manuals.” 18 Other regulatory bodies soon followed
suit, increasing the demand for ratings. 19 Despite this attempt to restrict
what securities certain firms could purchase, one glaring loophole
regarding the ratings remained. Without further classification for which

13.
14.

Id.
Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter
Oversight and Government Reform Hearing] (statement of Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform). See also Steven L.
Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002).
15. See Lowenstein, supra note 12.
16. See Oversight and Government Reform Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform).
Each rating agency has its own nomenclature unique to its rating scale, but each
generally follows the same methodology. Moody’s, for example, rates bonds on a scale
with 21 steps, from AAA to C. Ratings that begin with the letter “A” carry the least
amount of risk, those beginning with “B” have moderate risk and those with a “C”
rating are in poor standing or default. See Lowenstein, supra note 12. For the purposes
of this paper, references to “Triple-A” or “AAA” will denote bonds with the least
amount of risk.
17. Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the
Build up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2009).
18. Darren J. Kisgen & Philip E. Strahan, Do Regulations Based on Credit Ratings
Affect a Firm’s Cost of Capital? 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14890, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353327.
19. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1117; see also infra notes 31-39.
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rating agency’s ratings could be used for these regulations, anyone could
establish an arbitrary firm to provide “ratings” that would circumvent
the effects of the regulations. 20
The rating business grew at a slow and steady pace until 1970,
when the sudden and unexpected collapse of Penn Central 21 caused
investors to think twice about what information the rating agencies were
providing. 22 Investors were furious that the rating agencies failed to
foresee this bankruptcy. The collapse of Penn Central put the rating
agencies in the spotlight, and the idea of credit risk at the forefront of
investors’ minds.
The government responded. In 1975, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) decided to penalize brokers for holding bonds that
were less than investment grade and created a category of officially
designated rating agencies, “nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations” (“NRSROs”) to determine what exactly “investment
grade” meant and finally answering the question of which rating
agency’s ratings could be used. 23 The SEC immediately grandfathered
the three existing agencies – Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”),
Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) and Fitch – into the NRSRO category. 24
This designation made Moody’s, S&P and Fitch the “official arbiters of
financial soundness,” 25 and gave a tremendous amount of power to a
small number of rating agencies. 26 Dubbing the “big three” rating
agencies NRSROs was supposed to make it easier for investors to know
their investments were safe, 27 and the new SEC regulations and NRSRO
designation quickly turned rating agencies from mere opinion givers into
indispensable gatekeepers. 28
The rise of the rating agencies, and particularly the development of
NRSROs, had a huge regulatory impact in the United States. Originally
used as a basis for judging the quality of securities that broker-dealers

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 8.
In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 484 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1973).
See Lowenstein, supra note 12.
Id.
See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 8.
See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
BARRY RITHOLTZ & AARON TASK, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY
MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 158 (2009).
27. See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
28. Id.
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could use to satisfy their capital requirements, 29 today, many investment
rules and regulations are based on a bond’s credit rating as provided by
the rating agencies, and particularly by NRSROs. 30 For example, under
the 1940 Act, taxable money market funds may not hold more than five
percent of their assets in securities rated below the top tier ratings of at
least two rating agencies. 31 In 1951, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners established a “Securities Valuation Office” to
assign risk ratings to bonds held in the investment portfolios of
insurance companies. 32 The Securities Valuation Office used ratings
corresponding to those of the major rating agencies. 33 Under the
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, “mortgage
related securities” ranked in one of the two highest rating categories by
at least one NRSRO were deemed acceptable investments for federal
savings and loan associations and credit unions. 34 In 1988, the
Department of Labor instituted a regulation permitting pension fund
investment in asset-backed securities only if they were rated A or
better. 35 By 1994, Savings and Loans, who had already gone through
significant reorganization following the Banking Act of 1935, were
prohibited from investing in “junk bonds,” as designated by the rating
agencies. 36 The Eurobond and Asset-Backed Securities markets now
often require a certain rating for a firm in order for that firm to
participate in the market. 37 Even state regulations now require certain
ratings as provided by NRSROs. 38
Clearly, the scope and use of credit ratings, and particularly a rating
provided by an NRSRO is vast, and well beyond its original intentions.
The SEC acknowledges, “Although we originated the use of the term
NRSRO for a narrow purpose in our own regulations, ratings by
NRSROs today are used widely as benchmarks in federal and state
legislation, rules issued by other financial regulators, in the U.S. and

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1374.
See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1369.
See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8 (stating that “California state regulations prohibit Californiaincorporated insurance companies from investing in bonds rated below single-A.”).
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abroad, and private financial constructs.” 39
With so many institutions and regulatory bodies relying on the
ratings granted by NRSROs, these entities became indispensible tools
for institutional investors. In the rating agency business, the “big three”
(NRSROs Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) control 95% of the market. 40 A
rating from one of these agencies was like a key that could unlock the
regulatory system, giving institutional investors a wide range of
investment possibilities. In essence, a better rating by an NRSRO meant
better regulatory treatment for these investors. 41
The importance of an NRSRO’s rating on a firm is demonstrated in
a study conducted by Darren J. Kisgen and Philip E. Strahan. 42 Since
designating the “big three” NRSROs, the SEC has infrequently
designated any additional agencies, 43 leaving Moody’s, S&P and Fitch
the only NRSROs. However, in 2003, the SEC designated Dominion
Bond Rating Service (“DBRS”) as the fourth NRSRO. 44 Studying the
effects of DBRS’s status as an NRSRO, Kisgen and Strahan found that
the change in status from non-NRSRO to NRSRO changed the impact of
DBRS’ ratings on a firm’s yield bonds. 45
With respect to asset-backed securities, the rating from an NRSRO
became an essential component in the sale of a corporate bond or
package of mortgages. Obtaining the highest, triple-A rating became a
necessity 46 and issuers’ lawyers began spending a considerable amount
of time negotiating with the rating agencies in order to achieve such
ratings. 47 The fact that the rating agencies were able to dictate what
financial institutions could and could not do simply by way of what
rating they attached to a particular securities gave the rating agencies,
and particularly NRSROs the force of law. 48 This was a significant step
for the rating agencies, considering they were private companies. 49
Rating agencies and NRSROs gained even more power when they
39.
40.

Id. at 8.
See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1114 (Moody’s and S&P alone control 80% of
the market.).
41. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 66.
42. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18.
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
47. Mendales, supra note 4, at 1375.
48. Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
49. Id.
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were allowed to switch from having investors pay for their services to
charging the issuers of debt for their services. 50 Now, realizing they had
an invaluable product, rating agencies were able to leverage their power.
Since so many regulations required issuers to seek ratings from the
rating agencies and NRSROs, the rating agencies started charging these
issuers a pretty penny for favorable ratings, 51 and the issuers were
willing to pay. Suddenly, the rating agency business had grown from
advisory, to necessary, to big-money-makers. The rating agencies
latched on to their profit potential.
With the new payment structure, nearly every company that
publicly traded bonds began paying the rating agencies directly for their
services. 52 The average cost of these services ranged between $30,000
and $100,000. 53 In some instances, Wall Street paid as much as $1
million for ratings. 54
With the new millennium, both Moody’s and S&P went public and
a push for an even greater revenue growth resulted. 55 In 2000, when
Moody’s went public, mid-level executives at the company were given
stock options. 56 These executives therefore had incentive to consider
not just the accuracy of their ratings but also the effect those ratings
would have on Moody’s as a business. 57 An investment bank might be
willing to pay a higher fee for an AAA rating than a BB rating. Not
surprisingly, when Moody’s went public, its profits increased by
900%. 58 By 2002, Moody’s was worth more than Bear Stearns, which,
at the time was a prominent investment bank. 59 Revenues that were
$800.7 million in 2001 soon topped $1.73 billion in 2005 and reached
$2.03 billion in 2006. 60
Although “[t]he public may think of [the rating agencies] as
detached arbiters of security quality, like a financial Supreme Court . . .
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Hall, supra note 7.
Lowenstein, supra note 12.
PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 66.
Id.
See Hall, supra note 7.
60 Minutes: House of Cards: The Mortgage Meltdown (CBS television
broadcast Jan. 23, 2008) (interview between Steve Kroft and Jim Grant) [hereinafter 60
Minutes].
56. See Hall, supra note 7.
57. Id.
58. Lowenstein, supra note 12.
59. Id.
60. See Hall, supra note 7.
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[i]n fact, they were building booming, diversified, high-margin
businesses.” 61 Now that the rating agencies were money-hungry, profitdriven companies, the business became more like selling “licenses” than
issuing opinions. 62 The rating agencies did their part to feed the
enthusiasm and began targeting areas that would provide them with the
fastest, greatest revenue growth. 63 In the rating agency business, the
more complex a financial structure, the higher the fee can be, and in the
2000s, rating agencies jumped at the opportunity to rate the very CDOs
based upon subprime mortgages that led to the eventual collapse of our
economy. 64
II. THE ROLE OF THE RATING AGENCIES
IN THE SECURITIZATION MARKET
The origins of CDOs being based upon subprime mortgages, or
mortgage-backed securities, which led to the current financial crisis, go
back to the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) in
1934. 65 Before the FHA was established, mortgage lending was
dominated by Savings & Loans (“S&L”). 66 S&Ls used the deposits
from their customers to make loans, and were therefore limited in the
number and amount of mortgage financing each S&L could provide. 67
The FHA insured mortgagors and their successors in interest against
mortgage defaults on loans, and between 1938 and 1970, three
government-sponsored entities were created in order to facilitate the
creation of a secondary market for these mortgages: the Federal National
Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
These
and the Government National Mortgage Association. 68
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) began issuing mortgagebacked securities. 69 The GSEs established strict underwriting and
documentation standards and lenders who wished to sell their loans to

61. CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH
ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 77 (2008).
62. Id.
63. 60 Minutes, supra note 55.
64. Mendales, supra note 4, at 1361.
65. Dennis, supra note 17, at 1119.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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the GSEs had to comply with these standards. 70 By becoming de facto
regulators of the quality of the mortgages they packaged, the GSEs
played a substantial role in ensuring the quality of the loans behind the
mortgage-backed securities they issued. 71
Investors were drawn to the mortgage-backed securities issued by
the GSEs because of the implicit government guarantee behind them that
the GSEs were “simply too big to fail.” 72 Soon, realizing the potential
of mortgage-backed securities, private institutions were created that
issued mortgage-backed securities. However, the private institutions
lacked the “government guarantee” of the GSEs, and the biggest
purchasers of the non-GSE mortgage-backed securities were big
investment banks that did not uphold the same stringent underwriting
standards of the GSEs. 73
Mortgage lenders now had incentive to loan money to riskier
borrowers, and sell those riskier loans to investment banks that would
then issue the mortgage-backed securities to investors. 74 Investors
purchasing the non-GSE mortgage-backed securities had no implicit
government guarantee, and had no documentation regarding the
underlying loans in the security. 75 Therefore, the only indication of the
quality of the loans rested upon the rating given to the security by the
rating agencies. “In a practical sense, it was Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s that set the credit standards that determined which loans Wall
Street could repackage and, ultimately, which borrowers would qualify.
Effectively, they did the job that was expected of banks and government
regulators.” 76
Though the rating agencies became the de facto watchdogs over the
mortgage industry, 77 they were not loan officers. 78 Rating agencies were
often given one day to process, analyze and rate the credit data received
from an investment bank. 79 Despite the quick turnaround, the
securitized products created by the mortgage-backed security scheme

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Lowenstein, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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quickly became the most powerful (and profitable) tool for the rating
agencies. 80 Because the rating given by a rating agency was essentially
the only indicator of a package’s “worth,” 81 the rating agencies took
advantage of investment banks that were willing to pay high fees for
high-rated securities. “[T]he rating agencies charged fees on crappy
AAA-rated paper that were twice as big on subprime paper versus
prime-based loans. And Bloomberg estimated that from 2002 to 2007,
the agencies garnered fees on $3.2 trillion in subprime-based
mortgages.” 82
The “watchdog” role created a conflict of interest for the rating
agencies. The mortgage-backed securities sold and rated by the rating
agencies did not have any fixed standards with respect to the quality of
the underlying debt instruments. 83 With so much emphasis placed on
the rating provided by a rating agency, “a system largely outside the
bounds of securities regulation – the ratings issued by private rating
agencies – largely displaced the structured disclosure requirements of
securities law as the primary basis for investors’ purchase of the
securities either as direct investments or as components of derivative
securities.” 84 With no direct regulation, and no fixed standards with
respect to the underlying debt instruments, could a rating agency
essentially give a security any rating it wanted?
With the failure of CDOs beginning in 2006 and reaching
dimensions beyond anyone’s imagination by 2007, 85 many began to
wonder whether the rating agencies did issue arbitrary ratings to these
mortgage-backed securities. In April 2007, Moody’s announced that the
model it introduced in 2002 was no longer a good indicator for subprime mortgages, 86 and although the rating agencies tightened
methodology for rating mortgage-backed securities beginning in the
Summer of 2007, their efforts were too little, too late, and billions of
dollars of securities were downgraded. 87

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
See RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 26, at 112.
Mendales, supra note 4, at 1368.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1362.
Lowenstein, supra note 12.
Id.
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III. THE COLLAPSE OF AN EMPIRE?
With so much weight placed on ratings as indicators of a mortgagebacked security’s worth, many financial analysts are pointing blame for
the 2007 financial crisis on the rating agencies themselves. In fact,
many now argue that the rating agencies knew what they were doing.
Rating agencies were deliberately overstating ratings, with little thought
to the underlying debt instruments, in order to win over investment
banks and increase their revenues.
This was a systematic and aggressive strategy to replace a culture
that was very conservative, an accuracy-and-quality oriented
[culture], a getting-the-rating-right kind of culture . . . that was
supposed to be ‘business friendly,’ but was consistently less likely to
88
assign a rating that was tougher than our competitors.

Rating agencies were established to give opinions, and were
therefore under no legal obligation to the investment banks for whom
they issued their opinions. 89 However, many now argue that the rating
agencies may have been too “business” driven. Some rating agency
employees admit they did not realize there was a compliance aspect to
the issuance of a rating. 90
“The credit-rating agencies suffer from a conflict of interest –
perceived and apparent – that may have distorted their judgment,
especially when it came to complex structured financial products.” 91 It
is this conflict of interest that may have made the rating agencies too
money-hungry, resulting in illegitimate and worthless ratings and
significantly contributing to the 2007 worldwide financial meltdown.
Several factors account for the conflict of interest that may have
altered the judgment of the rating agencies. First, the issuer-pays model,
where rating agencies receive payment for their ratings from the issuers
of the securities rather than the investors, shifts the focus of a rating
from protecting the investors to marketing the ratings. 92
Second, the rating agencies themselves were active participants in
88. See Hall, supra note 7 (quote by Mark Froeba, a senior vice president who
joined Moody’s structured finance group in 1997).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Lowenstein, supra note 12.
92. See Oversight and Government Reform Hearing, supra note 14, at 25.
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the creation of the faulty-structured products, not objective third-party
arbiters. When sending a security to a rating agency:
[u]nderwriters don’t just assemble a security out of home loans and
ship it off to the credit raters to see what grade it gets . . . . Instead,
they work with rating companies while designing a mortgage bond
or other security, making sure it gets high-enough ratings to be
93
marketable.

For example, during the most recent real estate boom, S&P rated
most senior tranches of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities AAA, and
issued upgrades to its junior tranches that were initially given lower
ratings. 94
Third, the banks themselves were gaming the system. Investment
banks were designing securities to “just meet” the rating agencies’
tests, 95 and in return, the three major rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P and
Fitch were “engaged in a form of payola. They were willing to play
along with the investment banks, putting triple-A ratings on paper that
turned out to be junk – if the price was right. Call it ‘pay for play.’” 96 It
should be no real coincidence, then, that the big investment banks would
return again and again to the same rating agency despite astronomical
fees. 97
Finally, the weight placed on the ratings of mortgage-backed
securities is itself, its own worst enemy.
The real problem is not that the market . . . under weighs ratings
quality but rather that in some sectors, it actually penalizes quality . .
. it turns out that ratings quality has surprisingly few friends: issuers
want high ratings; investors don’t want ratings downgrades; short98
sighted bankers labor short-sightedly to game the ratings agencies.

Where the system itself is not looking for quality ratings, why
should a rating agency put forth extra effort to supply “quality” when a

93. See RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 26 (quoting Aaron Lucchetti, How Rating
Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A1).
94. Nelson, supra note 3, at 1186.
95. Lowenstein, supra note 12.
96. See RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 26.
97. Lowenstein, supra note 12.
98. Raymond McDaniel, Confidential Presentation to Moody’s Board of Directors
(Oct. 21, 2007), available at http://content.lawyerlinks.com/library/sec/briefs/2007/moo
dys/moodys_declaration_111708_F.pdf.
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client does not look for it?
The inherent and apparent conflict of interests drove some rating
agencies to take drastic measures to ensure a profitable, booming
business. Moody’s is said to have fired analysts and executives who
warned of trouble before the housing market collapsed in 2007. 99
Moreover, it pushed out employees in its compliance department,
replacing them with “business people” who had given the highest ratings
to pools of mortgages that were later downgraded to junk. 100
The creation of privately sponsored mortgage-backed securities
coupled with the power granted to rating agencies by regulatory bodies
and NRSRO designation made it impossible for investors to not rely on
the ratings issued by the rating agencies. Moreover, it may have let the
rating agencies exert too much influence on the securities they rated. 101
Once a mortgage-backed security was given a rating, and if that rating
were AAA, investors no longer cared about the underlying debt
instruments. 102 Too much reliance on one ingredient is a risky game to
play, and investors and the rating agencies should not have let a
security’s rating become a rubber-stamp to buy or sell.
Investors were not the only party who failed to recognize the
underlying debt instruments in a security. The rating agencies
themselves do not perform due diligence to ensure adequate
documentation for each mortgage pooled into a mortgage-backed
security, nor do the rating agencies adhere to the same strict standards of
the GSEs. 103 The rating agencies further failed to account for the effects
of the deterioration of underwriting standards as was reported by the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency. 104 In each of the years 2004
through 2007, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reported
that banks had eased their underwriting standards. 105 By failing to
account for these changes, rating agencies continued to assign high
ratings to mortgage-backed securities likely composed of riskier and
riskier loans.
In light of the recent financial collapse, financial analysts and
investors point out that the models used by the rating agencies were
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Hall, supra note 7.
Id.
See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
See Lowenstein, supra note 12.
See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1377; see also supra notes 71-72.
See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1126-27.
Id.
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based on historical data that did not reflect accurate characteristics of
subprime mortgages. 106 Rating agency models rely upon the historical
performance of a class of assets in order to predict how it will perform in
the future, 107 but with respect to subprime mortgages, had the rating
agencies based their models on more recent data, their ratings may have
been more accurate. Agencies typically resist changing their models and
assigned ratings because when they do, the change tends to be belated,
widespread and big. 108 Due to the restrictions imposed by regulatory
bodies, institutional investors cannot hold many low-rated securities.
Therefore, when rating agencies downgrade their ratings, it leads to
forced selling and magnified panic and prevents others from buying the
securities. 109
Rating agencies have no real incentive to update their statistical
models to reflect changing market conditions because there is an
absence of effective competition.110 S&P and Moody’s have enjoyed a
near duopoly in rating asset-backed securities 111 and the SEC has helped
promulgate this “big boys club.” From 1975 to 2000, the SEC
designated only four more firms as NRSROs, but mergers always
reverted them back to the “big three,” Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. 112
Though a rating agency must apply to the SEC in order to obtain
NRSRO status, the SEC has never provided qualifications for NRSRO
designation, making it infinitely difficult for rating agencies to obtain
recognition. 113 The process of obtaining NRSRO status has been
criticized for its lack of transparency regarding qualifications and for

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1124.
Id.
Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
Id. For example, despite market consensus, throughout the summer and fall of
2001, the rating agencies kept Enron at investment grade, despite the fact that its credit
was deteriorating. On November 28, 2001, S&P finally changed Enron’s bond to subinvestment grade, causing the stock to collapse. Four days later, Enron filed for
bankruptcy. See Lowenstein, supra note 12. In another example, when the S&P
downgraded General Motors to speculative grade, its bonds fell 8%. One reason for the
8% drop was that the downgrade prohibited many institutions from owning the debt.
See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 3.
110. See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1375.
111. Id. at 1377.
112. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 9.
113. Id. (“The primary guidance for whether a firm would qualify [as an NRSRO],
was that the firm should be ‘nationally recognized’ in the United States and be an issuer
of ‘credible and reliable ratings.’”).
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effectively limiting the number of certified rating agencies. 114

IV. THE REALITY OF REFORM?
“You have legitimized these things, leading people into dangerous
risk.” 115
With rating agencies (and particularly NRSROs) blessed by the
government to have the official word with respect to the ratings assigned
to securities, very few people ever questioned the veracity of the rating
agency business. 116 The rating agency process ran like a well-oiled
machine (that is, until the collapse of the housing market and the
resulting financial windfall). With so many aspects of business
transactions affected by the rating agency business, is it possible to
reform rating agencies in a way that will prevent another financial
meltdown in the future?
Even with the inclusion of ratings in so many facets of financial
regulatory schemes, NRSROs owe no clear legal responsibility to the
public to rate securities with care. 117 In fact, previous courts have held
that the opinions of rating agencies are the equivalent to editorial
commentary that is constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment. 118 Some argue, however, that it is unfair for rating
agencies to be protected when accounting firms also give opinions and
can be sued. 119 Until future courts find that rating agencies are no longer
afforded their First Amendment protection, it will be difficult to find an
NRSRO liable for damages with respect to its ratings.
114.
115.

Id. at 8-9.
See RITHOLTZ & BARRY, supra note 26, at 158 (a July 2007 e-mail from an
executive of Fortis Investments, a money management firm, to Moody’s).
116. Id.
117. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1144.
118. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 1189. See also Dennis, supra note 17, at 1121
(stating that rating agencies have asserted that they are financial publishers and that as
financial publishers, they are entitled to the heightened protections of the “actual
malice” standard. Under the “actual malice” standard, a publisher will not be liable for
false statements unless the statement is made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.).
119. The Latest in the Financial Services Crisis: Government Control v. The Free
Market, Speech at the 2008 National Lawyers Convention (Nov. 21, 2008), in 5 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 259, 263 (2009).
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Rating agency reform may not be possible simply because previous
attempts at reform have failed. After the collapse of Enron, Congress
ordered the SEC to investigate the rating agency business and reform the
rating process, but the SEC failed to do so. 120 In 2006, Congress passed
the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (“CRARA”). 121 CRARA sought
to bring the rating agencies within the jurisdiction of securities laws, 122
but prohibited the SEC from “regulating the substance of credit ratings
or the procedures and methodologies by which any NRSRO determines
credit ratings.” 123 CRARA also required that the SEC establish clearer
guidelines for which firms could qualify for NRSRO status 124 and
required that rating agencies applying for NRSRO status discuss its
methods and general procedures in its NRSRO registration
application. 125 It did not, however, require that the rating agencies
disclose the data underlying its statistical models or other methodologies
applied to the individual securities being rated. 126
Though a valiant attempt at reform, CRARA was ineffective.
While CRARA aimed to generate more competition among NRSROs by
establishing clearer guidelines for the qualification of NRSRO status, it
required that a rating agency be in business for at least three years before
the SEC could accredit it. 127 Moreover, it required that an agency
applying for NRSRO status provide written certifications from at least
ten “qualified institutional buyers.” 128
These provisions create a Catch-22: securities that do not receive
high ratings from agencies accredited as NRSROs cannot be used as
regulatory capital and are therefore difficult to market; but an agency
cannot be accredited unless it can rate securities for at least three
129
years and get recommendations from at least ten satisfied clients.

CRARA was also ineffective in that it ignored many of the
concerns expressed by the SEC, such as transparency in the rating
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See Lowenstein, supra note 12.
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process. 130
The rating agency business has remained unchanged because no
one bothered, or wanted to change it before. “The rapid increase in
demand for ratings of mortgage based securities and CDOs created an
environment in which the benefits of inaccurate ratings outweighed
potential costs.” 131 First, the profits generated from issuing ratings on
mortgage-backed securities were immense, regardless of their
accuracy. 132 Second, evidence that investment banks would pay higher
fees to rating agencies that awarded them higher ratings suggests that
rating agencies cared less about their reputation than the amount of fees
they earned. 133 Third, there was such a high demand for the ratings of
mortgage-backed securities that the investors themselves seemed to care
less about the reputation of the rating agency or the accuracy of the
rating. 134 Finally, because rating agencies are not subject to liability
when their ratings are included in prospectuses, their liability costs are
so low, it is not a deterrent to issuing inaccurate ratings. 135
The above rationales for inaccurate ratings really highlight the point
– do people really care? Last summer, the SEC announced plans to
reform the rating agency business, but pressures by big investors
squashed them. 136 Evidently, the investors involved in the rating process
see no reason to fix what may not necessarily be broken. There were a
host of other factors besides the inaccuracy of credit ratings that
contributed to the 2007 financial meltdown. However, with so much
exposed now, an economic recovery may depend in part on a reform of
the rating agencies. Investors must stop depending so heavily on
ratings, but what investors still depend on must be truthful and accurate.
“‘If credit remains paralyzed, small banks cannot finance the housing
demand. They have to take [investment banks] these mortgages and
move them to a global audience . . . . That can’t happen unless the world
trusts the gatekeeper.’” 137
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V. NECESSITY FOR REFORM
Though investors may not want the ratings business to change, and
despite previous reform failures, in the wake of the housing market
collapse it is clear that the rating agencies deliberately underestimated
the risks of mortgage-backed securities in pursuit of their own selfinterests, to the detriment of investors, and ultimately, the market. 138
The only way to prevent rating agencies from remaining conflicted
gatekeepers is to impose some type of reform that will eliminate the
greed and deceit from the rating agency business. As the rating agency
business stands now:
[It] provides a ready-made excuse for failure: as long as you’re
buying AAA-rated assets, you can say you’re being responsible.
After the housing crash, though, we know how illusory those AAA
ratings can be. It’s time for investors to face reality: working with a
fake safety net is more dangerous than working without any net at
139
all.

One dominant view of regulation of rating agencies is the
“reputational capital” theory. The “reputational capital” theory holds
that a rating agency’s interest in maintaining a reputation for accurate
ratings will be sufficient incentive to insure accurate ratings by that
rating agency. 140 In the 1920s, near its inception, the rating agency
business did operate along a “reputational capital” model. 141 When a
rating agency issued its rating, investors and analysts would comment
on, and often disagree with the agency’s rating. 142 With this type of
investor involvement, rating agencies were driven to issue accurate
ratings. There was no correlation between the fee a rating agency
received and the rating it issued. Under a “reputational capital” theory, a
reputation for accurate ratings alone would bring in business.
Interestingly, scholars still supported the “reputational capital”
theory in 2002 finding that a “lack of official public scrutiny does not
appear to affect ratings accuracy because of the de facto accountability
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See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1114.
See Surowiecki, supra note 6, at 25.
See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1114.
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 640 (1999).
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of rating agencies through reputation.” 143 It was then hypothesized that
the NRSRO designation of a rating agency would act as an indirect form
of merit regulation. 144 An NRSRO designation signified government
approval, therefore an NRSRO should have been driven to issue
accurate ratings because it had a government-like reputation to uphold.
Since 2002, however, it has become apparent that neither merit
regulation by way of an NRSRO designation nor “reputational capital”
is sufficient to promote rating accuracy among the rating agencies.
Another view of rating agency reform suggests that giving more
rating agencies NRSRO designation could radically alter the incentive of
rating agencies to issue accurate ratings. 145 As the system stands today,
NRSROs are private profit-maximizing entities that will always
maximize short-term benefits with long-term losses likely suffered. 146
The addition of more NRSRO-designated entities creates more
competition among NRSROs, potentially cutting profits from an
NRSRO that is not issuing accurate ratings.
Rating agencies’ contribution in the most recent financial crisis
suggests that reputation and merit-based reform alone will not change
the current behavior and business models of the rating agencies.
Something must be done to restrict the rating agencies so that their
ratings lose a little bit of their aura and investors trust them a little bit
less. The government is in the best position to restrict the powers of the
rating agencies by enacting legislation that reforms their business
models.
Curtailing investor reliance upon ratings, and particularly
inaccurate ratings, begins with reducing the notion that rating agencies
are fully endorsed and supported by the government. One proposal
suggests that NRSROs should be changed from “nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations” to “nationally registered statistical rating
organizations.” 147 Though it may be difficult to change the implication
of “NRSRO” when the acronym itself does not change, the use of the
term “registered” versus “recognized” removes a sense of endorsement
143. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002).
144. Id.
145. See Kisgen & Strahan, supra note 18, at 23.
146. See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1132.
147. Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Spencer Bachus, Member, H.
Comm. on Financial Services).
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by the government.
Others suggest removing NRSRO designation all together.
Moody’s itself favors doing away with the official designation, 148 but
without any type of rating agency registration, we will revert back to the
problem of “ratings according to whom?” 149
As discussed in Part III of this paper, 150 the rating agency business
did not do its due diligence with respect to rating mortgage-backed
securities. “This system will not get fixed until someone credible does
the necessary due diligence” 151 and many propose that legislation be
enacted to ensure that rating agencies follow a high standard of review,
much like that followed by the GSEs. 152 At minimum, Congress should
impose regulations that require NRSRO designated firms to have
sufficient analytical and operational resources in their company. 153
The rating process needs to become more transparent “so that a
rating is more than a ‘black box’ representing the unregulated label
placed by a credit rating agency on the creditworthiness of securities so
complex that even financial institutions cannot use traditional securities
disclosure to evaluate risks embodied by a CDO.” 154 In an attempt to
make the process more transparent, the SEC proposed new regulations
that “would require the disclosure of all information provided to an
NRSRO for the formulation of a rating by issuers, depositors,
underwriters and other parties involved in issuing securities . . . .” 155
However, the SEC proposal says nothing about the nature or reliability
of the information provided to NRSROs by these entities. 156 Moreover,
this proposal could create a new type of competition among rating
agencies. Instead of competing for higher fees, rating agencies could
begin “compet[ing] for business by offering high[er] ratings based on
minimal documentation.” 157 Less documentation means that rating
agencies may give uninformed opinions, once again leading to the
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
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See supra notes 18-21.
See supra notes 103-115.
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Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Robert F. Auwaerter, Principal
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155. Id. at 1403.
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problem of inaccurate ratings.
The SEC proposed to further increase transparency in the rating
agency business by requiring that all information used in ratings become
available to all NRSROs, not just the rating agency providing the
rating. 158 Full disclosure to all rating agencies is meant to act as a peerto-peer check system, but under the proposed rule, NRSROs are under
no obligation to verify each other’s information. 159 There is a concern
that full disclosure to all rating agencies will universally limit disclosure
because issuers may not wish to share all information with all rating
agencies. 160 If an issuer is not willing to share all of its information with
its rating agency because it fears full disclosure to all NRSROs, again,
rating agencies may give uninformed opinions, leading to less reliable
ratings.
Realistically speaking, the most effective approach to a more
transparent rating system involves a two-step due diligence requirement
by which professionals employed by issuers and underwriters provide
complete and verified data to the rating agencies who then document the
statistical models they apply to the data and their application. 161 In
addition, issuers and underwriters should be required to provide rating
agencies with a wide array of information. The rating agencies
themselves are already requesting a greater amount of information 162 in
an attempt to catch any fraud that may have worked its way into a
security. 163
In addition to increased transparency in the rating system, and
because a rating is an essential component in a CDO, the rating agencies
should be subject to regulation beyond that imposed by CRARA, and
much like accountants and underwriters, the SEC should take the helm
in enforcing these regulations. 164 In addition, the SEC should consult
with and create an independent body, comparable to the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board. 165
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This body would include representatives of the rating agencies
themselves, the SEC, the Federal Reserve, and other government
regulatory agencies making use of the rating process, along with
representatives of the legal and auditing professions, and
professional economists. Its functions would include evaluating the
effectiveness of statistical models used by the rating agencies,
assuring that the agencies update the models frequently based on
experience and macroeconomic conditions, and assuring that the
agencies properly apply the models, both in the initial issuance of
166
securities and in periodic review of the ratings.

NRSROs argue that an independent oversight board would force
rating agencies to have similar views and stifle their ability to issue
valuable opinions. 167 However, an independent oversight board could
create a baseline standard that each rating agency must follow when
issuing ratings. 168 As a baseline, rating agencies would be free to
impose higher standards on themselves, which could give a rating
agency a competitive edge. The oversight board should frequently
update its baseline to prevent a rating agency model that looks
backward, while our lives, and investments, move forwards. 169 In
addition, in light of the recent economic events, it is reasonable to
require an asset-backed security to meet a minimum standard in order to
receive a top rating, and the creation of an independent oversight board
would create those guidelines. 170
In 2009, the House of Representatives proposed a bill to amend the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and address the recent
shortcomings of the rating agencies. 171 The Accountability and
Transparency in Rating Agencies Act (“H.R. 3890”) “builds on the
Administrations [sic] proposal and takes strong steps to reduce conflicts
of interest, stem market reliance on credit rating agencies and impose a
liability standard on the agencies.” 172 This bill is an important step
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
See Dennis, supra note 17, at 1148.
See Mendales, supra note 4, at 1410.
See supra notes 103-110. The rating agencies’ failure to account for the
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towards reform of the rating agencies because “[a]s gatekeepers to our
markets, credit rating agencies must be held to higher standards. We
need to incentivize them to do their jobs correctly and effectively, and
there must be repercussions if they fall short. This bill will take such
steps.” 173
H.R. 3890 expands on initial legislation proposed by the
Administration in that it (i) clarifies the ability of an individual to sue
NRSROs, thus making NRSROs more accountable with respect to their
ratings; (ii) adds a new duty to supervise an NRSRO’s employees and
authorizes the SEC to sanction supervisors for failing to do so; (iii)
requires each NRSRO to have a board with at least one third
independent directors and those independent directors are responsible
for overseeing policies and procedures aimed at preventing conflicts of
interest; (iv) enhances the responsibilities of NRSROs with respect to
conflicts of interest that arise out of the issuer-pays model, and contains
new requirements aimed to mitigate those conflicts of interest; (v)
requires greater public disclosure of information regarding the internal
operations and procedures of NRSROs; and (vi) requires that when an
employee of an NRSRO goes to work for an issuer, the NRSRO review
the work of that employee to make sure that all procedures were
followed and proper ratings were issued and report that information to
the SEC. 174

CONCLUSION
As we begin to recover from the 2007 financial crisis, it is clear that
by giving mortgage-backed securities the top ratings and
underestimating the risk of default and foreclosure, rating agencies made
a significant contribution to the financial meltdown. Rating agencies
were initially established to provide investors with a reliable,
standardized rating of the creditworthiness of a security. However, with
time, a few regulatory “rubberstamps” and a voracious market requiring
immediate ratings, rating agencies became booming, profit-driven
businesses. The rating agencies were doing so well, it seemed that they
could do no wrong. That is, until 2007, when it was discovered that the
CDOs with the highest ratings were worth far less than their face
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amounts.
Revenues, conflicts of interest and the regulatory schemes
themselves may have all contributed to these inaccurate ratings. With
the financial world pointing blame at the rating agencies, their empire as
we once knew it, is bound to collapse. Many suggest that in order to
prevent another financial crisis, we must reform the rating agency
process. Reforming the rating agencies, however, may not be an easy
task. Issuers and investors still crave high ratings, may still be willing to
pay enormous fees for those ratings, and previous attempts at reform
have failed. Moreover, where no one is quite sure what really went
wrong with respect to the financial crisis and inaccurate ratings,
legislation proposed to reform the rating agency business may fail to
address misaligned incentives, and revise procedures that have worked
all along.
That said, this paper argues that in order to prevent another
financial meltdown, our best defense is to enact legislation that will
reform the rating agencies, making the process more transparent and
legitimate. This will best be accomplished by first granting the SEC
with the power to enforce the regulation of rating agencies.
The SEC should curb investor reliance on the rating agencies by
changing NRSROs from “nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations” to “nationally registered statistical rating organizations.”
This change will help to remove some of the implicit government
guarantee and endorsement from the rating agencies.
The SEC must next create an independent oversight board for the
regulation of the rating agencies comparable to the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. This oversight board can effectively make
the rating process more transparent and legitimate by creating a baseline
standard that each rating agency must follow when issuing ratings. This
baseline standard must be updated frequently to account for such things
as market trends in order to maintain the most accurate ratings possible.
Together with the independent oversight board, the SEC must make
rating agencies more accountable for their ratings by imposing a twostep due diligence requirement and by requiring public disclosure of
their rating methods. In addition, the SEC should be granted the power
to sanction rating agencies that fail to fulfill their due diligence
requirement or fail to uphold any standards set forth by the oversight
board.
Even if less emphasis is placed on a credit rating, the U.S. financial
markets still depend upon the ratings issued by the rating agencies.
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Thus, to rid the world of rating agencies is not an option. However, in
order to secure our financial markets, the rating agency empire needs to
be reigned in and controlled. By way of SEC enforcement and an
independent oversight board, a more transparent and legitimate rating
agency business will do just that.

